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Abstract. This paper presents a sequent calculus and a dual domain
semantics for a theory of definite descriptions in which these expressions
are formalised in the context of complete sentences by a binary quantifier
I. I forms a formula from two formulas. Ix[F,G] means ‘The F isG’. This
approach has the advantage of incorporating scope distinctions directly
into the notation. Cut elimination is proved for a system of classical
positive free logic with I and it is shown to be sound and complete for
the semantics. The system has a number of novel features and is briefly
compared to the usual approach of formalising ‘the F ’ by a term forming
operator. It does not coincide with Hintikka’s and Lambert’s preferred
theories, but the divergence is well-motivated and attractive.
Keywords: Definite Descriptions · Positive Free Logic · Proof Theory ·
Sequent Calculus · Cut Elimination · Dual Domain Semantics.
1 Introduction
A definite description is an expression of the form ‘the F ’. Accordingly, the most
popular formalisations of the theory of definite descriptions treat them as term
forming operators: the operator ι binds a variable and turns an open formula
into a singular term ιxF . This treatment of definite descriptions goes back to
Whitehead and Russell [33].3 Whitehead and Russell, however, did not consider
definite descriptions to be genuine singular terms: they only have meaning in the
context of complete sentences in which they occur and disappear upon analysis:
‘The F is G’ is logically equivalent to ‘There is one and only one F and it is
G’. Following the work of Hinitkka [12] and Lambert [24], many logicians prefer
? The research in this paper was funded by the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation.
3 Frege’s treatment of the function that is a ‘substitute for the definite article’ is
different. Frege’s operator \ applies to names of objects, not to (simple or complex)
predicates or function symbols. Typically these names refer to the extensions of
concepts, but this is not necessary. \ξ returns the unique object that falls under a
concept, if ξ is a name of the extension of a concept under which a unique object
falls, and its argument in all other cases. See [9, §11].
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to formalise definite descriptions in a fashion where they are not straightfor-
wardly eliminable. In such systems, ι is governed by what has come to be called
Lambert’s Law :
(LL) ∀y(ιxFx = y ↔ ∀x(Fx↔ x = y))
The preferred logic of many free logicians is positive free logic, where formulas
containing names that do not refer (to objects considered amongst those that
exist) may be true. Then ‘The F is G’ is no longer equivalent to ‘There is one
and only one F and it is G’. In negative free logic, all atomic formulas containing
non-denoting terms are false, and the Russellian analysis is again appropriate.
There is agreement amongst free logicians that (LL) formalises the minimal
theory of definite descriptions. Lambert himself prefers a stronger theory [25]
that in addition has the axiom:4
(FL) t = ιx(x = t)
There are a number of other axioms that have been considered, but these two
will be the focus of the present investigation.5 The proof theory of the theory of
definite descriptions has received close study from the hands of Andrzej Indrze-
jczak.6 In a series of papers, Indrzejczak has investigated various formalisations
of theories of definite descriptions and provided cut free sequent calculi for them
[14–17, 19]. A cut free system of positive free logic of his will form the background
to the present paper. It is presented in the next section.
Whitehead and Russell also note the need for marking scope distinctions to
formalise the difference between ‘The F is not G’ and ‘It is not the case that the
F is G’. Free definite description theory in general ignores scope: the thought is
that free logic says only very little about definite descriptions when they do not
refer, and in case they do refer, scope distinctions no longer matter, as already
pointed out by Whitehead and Russell.
Scope distinctions are, however, worth considering. The present paper pro-
poses a proof-system and a semantics for a theory of definite descriptions in
which scope distinctions are incorporated directly into the symbolism. ‘The F
is G’ is formalised by a binary quantifier that takes two formulas and forms a
formula Ix[F,G] out of them. The notation is taken from Dummett [5, p.162].
It is also found in the work of Neale [30] and Bostock [2, Sec. 8.4]. The external
negation ‘It is not the case that the F is G’ is formalised by ¬Ix[F,G], the in-
ternal negation ‘The F is not G’ by Ix[F,¬G]. Natural deduction proof-systems
for this approach have been investigated by the present author in the context of
intuitionist non-free as well as negative and positive free logic [20, 21, 23]. Rules
suitable for a sequent calculus for classical positive free logic were formulated
4 This axiom bears some resemblance to Frege’s Basic Law VI, the sole axiom for his
operator \, which is a = \έ(a = ε) [9, §18]. But see footnote 3.
5 For a survey of various theories and their axioms, see [1, 8, 26, 29].
6 An earlier approach is by Czermak [4]. Gratzl provides a cut free proof system for
Russell’s theory of definite descriptions, including his method for marking scope [11].
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in [22].7 The latter system and its intuitionist counterpart were devised with
the intention to stay close to the systems of Hintikka and Lambert. The results
are rather complicated: I is governed by six rules, one right or introduction rule
and five left or elimination rules. Despite their complexities, the systems remain
proof-theoretically satisfactory as cut elimination and normalisation theorems
hold for them. The present paper severs the ties to Hintikka and Lambert and
considers alternative rules for I within classical positive free logic. The account
proposed here is rather simpler than the previous ones: I is governed by one right
rule, the same as before, but only two left rules. The result is a rather different
formal theory from the perspective of the validities provable from the rules and
compared to Hintikka’s and Lambert’s: the rules enforce the uniqueness of F , if
Ix[F,G] is true, but not its existence. The novelty of the present paper lies in
the addition of these new rules for I to classical positive free logic,8 the ensu-
ing alternative theory of definite descriptions, and the provision of a sound and
complete dual domain semantics for it.
The plan of this paper is as follows. The next section expounds Indrzejczak’s
sequent calculus formulation of classical positive free logic extended by rules
governing the binary quantifier I. Section 3 discusses consequences of the the-
ory and compares it to Hintikka’s and Lambert’s. Due to the absence of scope
distinctions in axiomatisations of ι based on (LL), a direct comparison between
the system proposed here and standard formalisations of definite descriptions
is not very illuminating: G(ιxF ) has no direct and natural correspondent, as
¬G(ιxF ) corresponds to two formulas, the internal and the external negation of
Ix[F,G]. Nonetheless, it is worth examining how the binary fares with respect
to analogues of(LL) and (FL), when ιxA = y is rendered as a binary quantifica-
tion Ix[A, x = y]. The latter formalises ‘The A is identical to y’, or ‘The A is y’
for short, which is exactly the reading one may give of ιxA = y. To anticipate,
while an analogue of (FL) is derivable in the system proposes here, only half
of an analogue of (LL) is. Section 4 proves that cut is still eliminable from the
extended system. Section 5 gives a formal semantics for classical positive free
logic extended by I. Section 6 proves the soundness and completeness of the
system. Some details of the completeness proof are relegated to the Appendix.
Section 7 gives rules tableaux proof system.
2 A Deductive Calculus for Classical Positive Free Logic
with a Binary Quantifier
Indrzejczak has provided a formalisation of classical positive free logic CPF in
sequent calculus with desirable proof-theoretic properties: cut is eliminable from
7 This paper also briefly considers rules for classical non-free and negative free logic.
8 The rules are, in fact, those given for non-free classical logic at the end of [22]: it is a
noteworthy result that, whereas in the context of this logic these rules are redundant
and Ix[F,G] definable in Russellian fashion as ∃x(F ∧ ∀y(F xy → x = y) ∧G), added
to classical positive free logic, the outcome is a theory of considerable logical and
philosophical interest.
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the system [18]. The definition of the language is standard. I will only consider
→, ¬, ∀ and a distinguished predicate symbol ∃!, the existence predicate, as
primitives.9 ∧, ∨, ∃ are defined as usual. Free variables are distinguished from
bound ones by the use of parameters a, b, c . . . for the former and x, y, z . . . for the
latter. t1, t2, t3 . . . range over the terms of the language, which are the parameters,
constants, and complex terms formed from them and function symbols. For
brevity I will write F or A instead of F (x) or A(x) etc., except in the case of
the existence predicate, where I’ll write ∃!x etc.. Axt is the result of substituting
t for x in A, where it is assumed that no variable free in t becomes bound in Axt ,
i.e. that t is free for x in A. Γ,∆ denote finite multisets of formulas. The rules
of CPF are as follows:

















Γ ⇒ ∆,A B, Γ ⇒ ∆
(L→)
A→ B,Γ ⇒ ∆
A,Γ ⇒ ∆,B
(R→)
Γ ⇒ ∆,A→ B
Axt , Γ ⇒ ∆(L∀) ∃!t, ∀xA, Γ ⇒ ∆
∃!a, Γ ⇒ ∆,Axa(R∀)
Γ ⇒ ∆, ∀xA
Axt2 , Γ ⇒ ∆(= I)
t1 = t2, A
x
t1 , Γ ⇒ ∆
t = t, Γ ⇒ ∆
(= E)
Γ ⇒ ∆
where in (R∀), a does not occur in the conclusion, and in (L∀), t is substitutable
for x in A. In (= I), A is atomic. The general case follows by induction.
To these we add rules for the binary quantifier I:
Γ ⇒ ∆,Axt Γ ⇒ ∆,Bxt Axa, Γ ⇒ ∆, a = t(RI)
Γ ⇒ ∆, Ix[A,B]
9 It would be possible to define ∃!t as ∃x x = t, where ∃ may in turn be defined in
terms of ∀ and ¬. However, treating it as primitive is formally and philosophically
preferable: formally, it lends itself more easily to cut elimination, and philosophically,
it permits to take existence as conceptually basic, with the quantifiers explained in
terms of it: the attempted definition of ∃! is arguably circular, as the rules of inference
governing ∀, which explain its meaning, appeal to ∃!. The semantic clause for ∀, too,
implicitly appeals to the concept of existence, as it ranges only over objects in the
domain of the model which are considered to exist, that is, those of which ∃! is true.
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Axa, B
x
a , Γ ⇒ ∆
(LI1)
Ix[A,B], Γ ⇒ ∆
Γ ⇒ ∆,Axt1 Γ ⇒ ∆,A
x




Ix[A,B], Γ ⇒ ∆,Cxt1
where in (RI) and (LI1), a does not occur in the conclusion, and in (LI2) C is
an atomic formula. The general case follows by induction.
Vacuous quantification with I is allowed. If x is not free in A, then the truth
of Ix[A,B] requires or imposes a restriction on the domain: if there is only one
object (existing or not), then, if A is true and B is true (of the object in the
domain, if x is free in B), then Ix[A,B] is true; and if Ix[A,B] is true, then, if
A is true, then there is only one object in the domain and B is true (of it, if x
is free in B). If x is not free in B, then Ix[A,B] is true if and only if a unique
object (existing or not) is A and B is true.
Call the resulting system CPFI . Deductions are defined as usual, as certain
trees with axioms at the top-nodes or leaves and the conclusion at the bottom-
node or root. If a sequent Γ ⇒ ∆ is deducible in CPFI , we write ` Γ ⇒ ∆.
3 Consequences of the Formalisation
Call two formulas ιxA = y and Ix[A, x = y] analogues of each other. They
both formalise the same sentence ‘The A is identical to y’. Similarly for B(ιxA)
and Ix[A,B], where we restrict B to atomic formulas to avoid complications
regarding scope. Let CPFι be CPF plus (LL) and (FL). Analogues provide a
convenient means for comparisons between CPFI and CPFι.
First we state the obvious. The Law of Identity ⇒ t = t and Leibniz’ Law




t1 are derivable in CPF:
t = t ⇒ t = t























t2 of course also holds, as established by step two of the left
deduction through interchanging t1 and t2.
Leibniz’ Law is no longer applicable to definite descriptions in the present
framework, as definite descriptions are not analysed as singular terms but only
in the context of complete sentences in which they occur. We can, however,
mimic its use, as we can derive the sequents Ix[A, x = t], Bxt ⇒ Ix[A,B],
Ix[A, x = t], Ix[A,B],⇒ Bxt and Ix[A, Iy[B, x = y]], Ix[A,C]⇒ Ix[B,C]. Using
analogues, these correspond to instances of Leibniz’ Law: ιxA = t, Bxt ⇒ B(ιxA),
ιxA = t, B(ιxA),⇒ Bxt and ιxA = ιyB,C(ιxA)⇒ C(ιyB). We’ll prove the first
for purposes of illustration. Double lines indicate applications of structural rules,
in particular those needed to make the contexts of the rules identical by Thin-
ning. Let Π be the following deduction in CPFI :
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Axb ⇒ Axb a = t, Axa ⇒ Axt ⇒ t = t
Ix[A, x = t], Axb , a = t, A
x
a ⇒ b = t
Ix[A, x = t], Ix[A, x = t], Axb ⇒ b = t
Ix[A, x = t], Axb ⇒ b = t
Then the following establishes the analogue of our instance of Leibniz’ Law:
a = t, Axa ⇒ Axt Bxt ⇒ Bxt Π
a = t, Axa, B
x
t , Ix[A, x = t] ⇒ Ix[A,B]
Ix[A, x = t], Bxt , Ix[A, x = t] ⇒ Ix[A,B]
Ix[A, x = t], Bxt ⇒ Ix[A,B]
To assess whether (LL) is provable, it is useful to have rules for the biconditional:
Γ ⇒ ∆,A,B A,B, Γ ⇒ ∆
(L↔)
A↔ B,Γ ⇒ ∆
A,Γ ⇒ ∆,B B, Γ ⇒ ∆,A
(R↔)
Γ ⇒ ∆,A↔ B
These are derivable from the rules for → given the usual definition of ↔.
Next we derive one half of an analogue of (LL) in CPFI :
Axa, a = b ⇒ Axb Axc ⇒ Axc ⇒ c = c
Ix[A, x = b], Axa, a = b, A
x
c ⇒ c = b Axa, a = b, c = b ⇒ Axc
Ix[A, x = b], Axa, a = b ⇒ Axc ↔ c = b
∃!c, Ix[A, x = b], Axa, a = b ⇒ Axc ↔ c = b
Ix[A, x = b], Axa, a = b ⇒ ∀x(A↔ x = b)
Ix[A, x = b], Ix[A, x = b] ⇒ ∀x(A↔ x = b)
Ix[A, x = b] ⇒ ∀x(A↔ x = b)
⇒ Ix[A, x = b] → ∀x(A↔ x = b)
∃!b ⇒ Ix[A, x = b] → ∀x(A↔ x = b)
⇒ ∀y(Ix[A, x = y] → ∀x(A↔ x = y))
The left and rightmost leaves are derivable by Leibniz’ Law.
The other half of (LL) is not derivable in CPFI . Intuitively, there being a
unique existing A is not sufficient for Ix[A,B], as there may also be non-existing
As in addition. It is straightforward to give a countermodel with the semantics
of Section 5.
⇒ Ix[x = t, x = t] follows by twice the Law of Identity and one application
of (RI), where both A and B are x = t:
⇒ t = t ⇒ t = t a = t ⇒ a = t
⇒ Ix[x = t, x = t]
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Thus the analogue of (FL) is derivable in CPFI . This is worth noting: Lambert
calls (FL) ‘an important theorem in traditional description theory’ [25, 58], and,
not being derivable in the minimal theory, is forced to add it as a further axiom.
The present theory of definite descriptions is thus not comparable to Hin-
tikka’s and Lambert’s minimal theory: it contains only one half of the analogue
(LL), but also the analogue of (FL). The first respect provides a sense in which
the present theory is weaker than Lambert’s preferred theory, the second one in
which it is stronger, because the rules for I and = yield the analogue of (FL)
immediately, while in Lambert’s theory, (FL) needs to be added as an extra
axiom governing the definite description operator ι. The novelty of the present
theory is shown by these features. In particular, the failure of the right to left half
of (LL) is, arguably and pace Hintikka and Lambert, desirable, for the reason
stated.
The theory does not allow the derivation of the analogue of ιxF = ιxF ,
Ix[F, Iy[F, x = y]]. This is a tolerable loss. As Russell is not identical to White-
head, it is not difficult to accept that ‘The author of Principia Mathematica = the
author of Principia Mathematica’ is not logically true. Reasons normally given
for accepting ιxF = ιxF is that it is an instance of the Law of Identity. These
reasons, however, are not conclusive, as the example shows. Ix[F, Iy[F, x = y]]
is not an instance of the Law of Identity, and hence accepting that law does not
force us to accept it. If more than two objects satisfy F , then it is false.
Its differences to Hintikka’s and Lambert’s theory of definite descriptions are
advantages of the present proposal. It allows us to reject the claim that the author
of Principia Mathematica is identical to the author of Principia Mathematica
and to declare ‘The author of Principia Mathematica smokes a pipe’ to be false.
If there is more than one A, existing or not, then Ix[A,B] is false, whatever B
may be: an identity, a predicate letter, a complex formula. The present theory
provides principled reasons for declaring certain sentences containing definite
descriptions to be false on which Hintikka and Lambert prefer to remain silent
and for not having to accept some sentences they pronounce as logically true on
grounds which one may well want to reject.
4 Cut Elimination for CPFI
We’ll continue Indrzejczak’s proof of cut elimination for CPF by adding the
cases covering I. Let d(A) be the degree of the formula A, that is the number
of connectives occurring in it. ∃!t is atomic, that is of degree 0. d(D) is the
degree of the highest degree of any cut formula in deduction D. Ak denotes
k occurrences of A, Γ k k occurrences of the formulas in Γ . The height of a
deduction is the largest number of rules applied above the conclusion, that is
the number of nodes of a longest branch in the deduction. The proof appeals to
the Substitution Lemma:
Lemma 1. If `k Γ ⇒ ∆, then `k Γ at ⇒ ∆at .
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Its proof goes through as usual. Consequently, we can always rewrite deductions
so that each application of (R∀), (RI) and (LI1) has its own parameter that
occurs nowhere else in the proof. In the following, it will be tacitly assumed that
deductions have been treated accordingly.
Lemma 2 (Right Reduction). If D1 ` Θ ⇒ Λ,A, where A is principal,
and D2 ` Ak, Γ ⇒ ∆ have degrees d(D1), d(D2) < d(A), then there is a proof
D ` Θk, Γ ⇒ Λk, ∆ with d(D) < d(A).
Proof. By induction over the height of D2. The basis is trivial: if d(D2) = 1, then
Ak, Γ ⇒ ∆ is an axiom and hence k = 1, Γ is empty, and ∆ consists of only one
A; we need to show Θ ⇒ Λ,A, but that is already proved by D1.
For the induction step, we consider the rules for I:
(I) The last step of D2 is by (RI). Then the occurrences Ak in the conclusion of
D2 are parametric and occur in all three premises of (RI): apply the induction
hypothesis to them and apply (RI) afterwards. The result is the desired proof
D.
(II) The last step of D2 is by (LI1). There are two options:
(II.a) If the principal formula Ix[F,G] of (LI1) is not one of the Ak, then apply
the induction hypothesis to the premises of (LI1) and then apply (LI1).
(II.b) If the principal formula Ix[F,G] of (LI1) is one of the Ak, then D2 ends
with:
F xa , G
x
a, Ix[F,G]
k−1, Γ ⇒ ∆
Ix[F,G]k, Γ ⇒ ∆
By induction hypothesis there is a deduction of F xa , G
x
a, Θ
k−1, Γ ⇒ Λk−1, ∆ with
cut degree less than d(A), and by the Substitution Lemma:
(1) F xt , G
x
t , Θ
k−1, Γ ⇒ Λk−1, ∆
A, i.e. Ix[F,G], is principal in D1, so it ends with an application of (RI):
Θ ⇒ Λ,F xt Θ ⇒ Λ,Gxt F xa , Θ ⇒ Λ, a = t
Θ ⇒ Λ, Ix[F,G]
Apply two cuts with (1) and the first and second premise, and conclude by
contraction Θk, Γ ⇒ Λk, ∆.
(III) The last step of D2 is by (LI2). In this case the succedent of the conclusion
of D2 is ∆,Ct1 , where Ct1 is an atomic formula. There are two cases.
(III.a) The principal formula Ix[F,G] of (LI2) is not one of the Ak: apply the
induction hypothesis to the premises of (LI2) and then apply the rule.
(III.b) The principal formula Ix[F,G] of (LI2) is one of the Ak. Then D2 ends
with:
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Ix[F,G]k−1, Γ ⇒ ∆,F xt1 Ix[F,G]
k−1, Γ ⇒ ∆,F xt2 Ix[F,G]
k−1, Γ ⇒ ∆,Cxt2
Ix[F,G]k, Γ ⇒ ∆,Ct1
By induction hypothesis, we have:
(1) Θk−1, Γ ⇒ Λk−1, ∆, F xt1
(2) Θk−1, Γ ⇒ Λk−1, ∆, F xt2
(3) Θk−1, Γ ⇒ Λk−1, ∆,Cxt2
A, i.e. Ix[F,G], is principal in D1, so it ends with an application of (RI):
Θ ⇒ Λ,F xt Θ ⇒ Λ,Gxt F xa , Θ ⇒ Λ, a = t
Θ ⇒ Λ, Ix[F,G]
The Substitution Lemma applied to the third premise gives
(5) F xt1 , Θ ⇒ Λ, t1 = t
(6) F xt2 , Θ ⇒ Λ, t2 = t
To show: ` Θk, Γ ⇒ Λk, ∆,Ct1 with d(D) < d(Ix[F,G]). Leibniz’ Law gives
(7) t1 = t, t2 = t⇒ t1 = t2
(8) Ct2 , t1 = t2 ⇒ Ct1
Cuts with (1) and (5) and with (2) and (6) give Θk, Γ ⇒ Λk, ∆, t1 = t and
Θk, Γ ⇒ Λk, ∆, t2 = t, whence by Cut with (7) and contraction Θk, Γ ⇒
Λk, ∆, t1 = t2, and from the latter by Cuts with (3) and (8) and contraction
Θk, Γ ⇒ Λk, ∆,Ct1 . As Ct2 in (LI2) is restricted to atomic formulas, the de-
gree of the ensuing deduction is less than d(A), i.e. d(Ix[F,G]), which was to be
proved.
This completes the proof of the Right Reduction Lemma.
Lemma 3 (Left Reduction). If D1 ` Γ ⇒ ∆,Ak and D2 ` A,Θ ⇒ Λ have
degrees d(D1), d(D2) < d(A), then there is a proof D ` Γ,Θk ⇒ ∆,Λk with
d(D) < d(A).
Proof by induction over the height of D1. The basis is trivial, as then D1 is an
axiom, and Γ consists of one occurrence of A and ∆ is empty. What needs to be
shown is that A,Θ ⇒ Λ, which is already given by D2.
For the induction step, we distinguish two cases, and again we continue In-
drzejczak’s proof by adding the new cases arising through the addition of I.
(A) No Ak in the succedent of the conclusion of D1 is principal. Then we apply
the induction hypothesis to the premises of the final rule applied in D1 and apply
the final rule once more.
(B) Some Ak in the succedent of the conclusion of D1 is principal. Two options:
(I) The final rule applied in D1 is (RI):
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Γ ⇒ ∆, Ix[F,G]k−1, F xt Γ ⇒ ∆, Ix[F,G]k−1, Gxt F xa , Γ ⇒ ∆, Ix[F,G]k−1, a = t
Γ ⇒ ∆, Ix[F,G]k
By induction hypothesis, we have
(1) Γ,Θk−1 ⇒ ∆,Λk−1, F xt
(2) Γ,Θk−1 ⇒ ∆,Λk−1, Gxt
(3) F xa , Γ,Θ
k−1 ⇒ ∆,Λk−1, a = t
Apply (RI) with (1) to (3) as premises to conclude
(4) Γ,Θk−1 ⇒ ∆,Λk−1, Ix[F,G]
Here Ix[F,G] is principal, so apply the Right Reduction Lemma to the deduction
concluding (4) and D2 (where k = 1) to conclude Γ,Θk ⇒ ∆,Λk.
(II) The final rule applied in D1 is (LI2):
Γ ⇒ ∆,Ct1
k−1, F xt1 Γ ⇒ ∆,Ct1
k−1, F xt2 Γ ⇒ ∆,Ct1
k−1, Cxt2
Ix[F,G], Γ ⇒ ∆,Ct1
k
By induction hypothesis, we have
(1) Γ,Θk−1 ⇒ ∆,Λk−1, F xt1
(2) Γ,Θk−1 ⇒ ∆,Λk−1, F xt2
(3) Γ,Θk−1 ⇒ ∆,Λk−1, Cxt2
Apply (LI2) with (1) to (3) as premises to conclude:
(4) Ix[F,G], Γ,Θk−1 ⇒ ∆,Λk−1, Cxt1
Here Cxt1 is principal, so apply the Right Reduction Lemma to the deduction
concluding (4) and D2 (where k = 1) to conclude Ix[F,G], Γ,Θk ⇒ ∆,Λk.
This completes the proof of the Left Reduction Lemma.
Theorem 1 (Cut Elimination). For every deduction in CPFI , there is a
deduction that is free of cuts.
Proof. The theorem follows from the Right and Left Reduction Lemmas by in-
duction over the degree of the proof, with subsidiary inductions over the number
of cut formulas of highest degree, as in Indrzejczak’s paper.
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5 Semantics for CPFI
For the purposes of providing a semantics for CPFI it is convenient to modify
the system slightly in the following way: free variables x, y, z . . . are allowed to
occur in formulas, parameters are treated like constants, and constants may play
the role of parameters if they occur parametrically in a deduction, that is, they
fulfil the restrictions imposed in (R∀), (RI) and (LI1). The restrictions for free
variables in these rules are as for the parameters. Furthermore, for the purposes
of this section, I take ⇒ to have sets of sentences rather the multisets to its left
and right. I’ll write Γ,A to abbreviate Γ ∪{A}, A,B,C ∈ ∆ for {A,B,C} ⊆ ∆.
The resulting modified system is evidently equivalent to the original formulation.
It is fairly obvious that the rules governing I enforce the uniqueness of A,
if it is the case that Ix[A,B], but not its existence. Arguing informally, it is
immediate from (LI2) that Ix[A,B], Axa, A
x
b ⇒ a = b, hence any As are identical;
and if Axa is false, whatever a might be, then A
x
a ⇒ ⊥, so by (LI1), Ix[A,B]⇒ ⊥.
But the rules do not permit us to determine whether the unique A exists or not.
Conversely, to derive Ix[A,B], we need a unique A that is B, but it is not
required that it exists. Nonetheless, we will prove it rigorously by providing a
sound and complete semantics for CPFI . I follow the popular proposal by [3],
[27] and [28], where two domains are considered, an inner one and an outer one,
the former the domain of existing objects, over which the universal quantifier
ranges and of which ∃! is true, and the latter the domain of ‘non-existent’ objects.
I shall take the inner domain to be a subset of the outer domain.
The exposition of the formal semantics for CPFI and the soundness and
completeness proofs in the next section follow Enderton closely, with necessary
adjustments to be suitable to free logic. Most of the following is well known
and not new, but I’ll be explicit about the details in order to demonstrate the
semantics of I explicitly and precisely.
A structure A is a function from the expressions of the language L of CPFI
to elements, a (possibly empty) subset, the sets of n-tuples of and operations on
a non-empty set |A|, called the domain of A, such that:
1. A assigns to the quantifier ∀ a (possibly empty) set |A∀| ⊆ |A| called the inner
domain or the domain of quantification of A.
2. A assigns to the predicate ∃! the set |A∀|.
3. A assigns to each n-place predicate symbol P an n-ary relation PA ⊆ |A|n.
4. A assigns to each constant symbol c an element cA of |A|.
5. A assigns to each n-place function symbol f an n-ary operation fA on |A|,
i.e. fA: |A|n → |A|.
Next we define the notion of satisfaction of a formula B by a structure A. To
handle free variables we employ a function s:V → |A| from the set of variables
V of L to the domain of the structure. Suppose x occurs free in B. Informally,
we say that A satisfies B with s, if and only if the object of the domain of A
that s assigns to the variable x satisfies B, that is, if s(x) is in the set A assigns
12 Nils Kürbis
to B. We express this in symbols by A A [s]. 2A A [s] means that A does not
satisfy A with s. The formal definition of satisfaction is as follows.
First, s is extended by recursion it to a function s that assigns objects of |A|
to all terms of the language:
1. For each variable x, s(x) = s(x)
2. For each constant symbol c, s(c) = cA.
3. For terms t1 . . . tn, n-place function symbols f , s(ft1 . . . tn) = f
A(s(t1) . . . s(tn))
Satisfaction is defined explicitly for the atomic formulas of L:
1. A t1 = t2 [s] iff s(t1) = s(t2).
2. A ∃!t [s] iff s(t) ∈ |A∀|.
3. For n-place predicate parameters P , A Pt1 . . . tn [s] iff 〈s(t1) . . . s(tn)〉 ∈ PA.
For the rest of the formulas, satisfaction is defined by recursion. Let s(x|d) be
like s, only that it assigns the element d of |A| to the variable x:
1. For atomic formulas, as above.
2. A ¬A [s] iff 2A A [s].
3. A A→ B [s] iff either 2A A [s] or A B [s].
4. A ∀xA [s] iff for every d ∈ |A∀|, A A [s(x|d)].
This gives a semantics for CPF. For CPFI , we add a clause for I:
5. A Ix[A,B] [s] iff there is d ∈ |A| such that: A A [s(x|d)], there is no other
e ∈ |A| such that A A [s(x|e)], and A B [s(x|d)].
In other words, A Ix[F,G] [s] iff there is exactly one element in the domain of
A such that A satisfies A with s modified to assign that element to x, and A
satisfies B with the same modified s.
We could define notions of validity, truth and falsity applicable to formulas, if
we like, but won’t need them in the following. A formula A is valid iff for every A
and every s:V → |A|, A A [s]. Call a formula with no free variables a sentence.
A structure A either satisfies a sentence σ with every function s:V → |A| or with
none. If the former, σ is true in A, if the latter, σ is false in A. If the former, we
may write A σ and say that A is a model of σ.
More important are notions applicable to the sequents of the deductive sys-
tem of CPFI . A sequent Γ ⇒ ∆ is satisfied by a structure A with a function
s:V → |A| if and only if, if for all A ∈ Γ , A A [s], then for some C ∈ ∆,
A C [s]. We symbolise this by A Γ ⇒ ∆ [s]. A sequent Γ ⇒ ∆ is valid iff it is
satisfied by every structure with every function s:V → |A|. In this case we write
 Γ ⇒ ∆.
Sequents have finite sets to the left and right of ⇒. We also need notions
that apply to finite and infinite set.
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A set of formulas Γ is satisfiable iff there is some structure A and some
function s:V → |A| such that A satisfies every member of Γ with s.
A set of formulas Γ deductively implies a formula A, iff for some finite Γ0 ⊆ Γ ,
` Γ ⇒ A. If Γ deductively implies A, we record this fact by Γ ` A.
A set of formulas Γ semantically implies a formula A, iff for every structure
A and every function s:V → |A| such that A satisfies every member of Γ with s,
A satisfies A with s. If Γ semantically implies A, we record this fact by Γ  A.
6 Soundness and Completeness
I’ll prove two pairs of soundness and completeness theorems: one pair shows that
deducibility and validity of sequents coincide, and another that deductive and
semantic implication coincide.
A formula A′ is an alphabetic variant of a formula A if A and A′ differ only
in the choice of bound variables.
Lemma 4 (Existence of Alphabetic Variants). For any formula A, term
t and variable x, there is a formula A′ such that A ⇒ A′ and A′ ⇒ A and t is
substitutable for x in A′.
Proof. Mutatis mutandis Enderton’s proof goes through for CPFI , too [6, 126f].
Alphabetic variants are semantically equivalent: if A and A′ are alphabetic vari-
ants, then A  A′ and A′  A.
Lemma 5 (The Substitution Lemma.). A Axt [s] iff A A [s(x|s(t))], if t
is free for x in A.
Proof. See [6, 133f] and adjust.
Theorem 2 (Soundness for Sequents). If ` Γ ⇒ ∆, then  Γ ⇒ ∆.
Proof. Standard, by induction over the complexity of deductions and observing
that the axioms are valid and all rules preserve validity. In the appendix, the
soundness of the rules for the ∀ and I is proved.
Theorem 3 (Soundness for Sets). If Γ ` A, then Γ  A.
Proof. If Γ ` A, then for some finite Γ0 ⊆ Γ , ` Γ0 ⇒ A. So by Theorem 2,
 Γ0 ⇒ A. Suppose some structure A satisfies all formulas of Γ with a function
s:V → |A|. Then A satisfies Γo with s, hence, as  Γ0 ⇒ A, A satisfies A with
s, and so Γ  A.
Some more definitions. Let ⊥ represent an arbitrary contradiction. A set of
formulas Γ is inconsistent iff Γ ` ⊥. Γ is consistent iff it is not inconsistent. A
set of formulas Γ is maximal iff for any formula A, either A ∈ Γ or ¬A ∈ Γ . A
set of formulas Γ is deductively closed iff, if Γ ` A, then A ∈ Γ .
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Lemma 6. Any maximally consistent set is deductively closed.
Proof. Suppose Γ is maximal and Γ ` A but A 6∈ Γ . Then for some finite
Γ0 ⊆ Γ , ` Γ0 ⇒ A. By maximality of Γ , ¬A ∈ Γ , hence for some finite Γ1 ⊆ Γ ,
` Γ1 ⇒ ¬A. Hence ` Γ0, Γ1 ⇒ A ∧ ¬A, and so Γ ` ⊥. Contradiction.
Theorem 4. Any consistent set of formulas ∆ can be extended to a maximally
consistent set ∆+ such that:
(a) for any formula A and variable x, if ¬∀xA ∈ ∆+, then for some constant c,
∃!c ∈ ∆+ and Axc 6∈ ∆+;
(b) for any formulas A and B and variable x, if Ix[A,B] ∈ ∆+, then for some
constant c, Axc , B
x
c ∈ ∆+ and for all constants d, if Axd ∈ ∆+, then d = c ∈ ∆+.
(c) for any formulas A and B and variable x, if ¬Ix[A,B] ∈ ∆+, then for all
constants c, either Axc 6∈ ∆+, or for some constant d, Axd ∈ ∆+ and d = c 6∈ ∆+,
or Bxc 6∈ ∆+.
Proof is in the appendix.
Theorem 5. If ∆ is a consistent set of formulas, then ∆ is satisfiable.
Proof is in the appendix.
Theorem 6 (Completeness for Sequents). If  Γ ⇒ ∆, then ` Γ ⇒ ∆.
Proof. Let ¬∆ be the negation of all formulas in ∆. If  Γ ⇒ ∆, then Γ,¬∆
is not satisfiable. Hence by Theorem 5 it is inconsistent, and as they are both
finite, ` Γ,¬∆⇒ ⊥. Hence by the properties of negation ` Γ ⇒ ∆.
Theorem 7 (Completeness for Sets). If Γ  A, then Γ ` A.
Proof. Suppose Γ  A. Then Γ,¬A is not satisfiable, hence by Theorem 5 it is
inconsistent and Γ,¬A ` ⊥. So for some finite Σ ⊆ Γ,¬A, Σ ⇒ ⊥. If ¬A ∈ Σ,
then by the deductive properties of negation, Σ −{¬A} ⇒ A, and as Σ −{¬A}
is certain to be a subset of Γ , Γ ` A. If ¬A 6∈ Σ, then Σ ⇒ A by the properties
of negation, and again Γ ` A.
7 Tableaux Rules
In this section, we’ll extend Priest’s tableaux system for classical positive free
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where t is any term on the branch (or a new one if there is none yet), a is new
to the branch and t3 is any term.







¬ a = t
¬Bxt¬Axt
where a is new to the branch and t is any term on the branch (or a new one if
there is none yet).
8 Conclusion
The theory of definite descriptions formulated here has some novel and attractive
features. The proof-theory is simple and has desirable consequences. It differs
from Hintikka’s and Lambert’s preferred theories in a well-motivated way. It
lends itself to applications of formalisations in which scope distinctions are of
importance. The distinction between internal and external negation has been
mentioned in the introduction. Other, and particularly interesting, cases are
found in modal discourse. There is a significant difference between ‘It is possible
the that present King of France is bald’ and ‘The present King of France is pos-
sibly bald’. In the present framework, the former is formalised by a formula such
as ♦Ix[Kx,Bx], the latter by Ix[Kx,♦Bx]. The importance of scope distinc-
tions in the context of modal logic was first pointed out by Smullyan [32]. His
account was further developed by Hughes and Cresswell [13, 323ff]. Elaborate
systems catering for definite descriptions in modal logic have been provided by
Fitting and Mendelsohn [7] and Garson [10]. In both of the latter systems, an
operator for predicate abstraction is used to mark scope, but it serves no further
purpose. Future research will investigate the addition of the binary quantifier
I to quantified modal logic and compare the result to existing systems. In par-
ticular, as the present system incorporates scope distinctions directly into the
formalism for representing definite descriptions, there is no need for additional
means to mark scope. This promises economy and clarity in the formalism for
representing definite descriptions where scope distinctions matter.
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9 Appendix. Proofs of Theorems 2, 4 and 5
Theorem 2 If ` Γ ⇒ ∆, then  Γ ⇒ ∆.
Proof. Here is the proof of soundness for the rules of ∀ and I.
(L∀). Suppose (1)  Axt , Γ ⇒ ∆, but (2) 6A ∃!t,∀xA, Γ ⇒ ∆. Then by (2),
there is a structure A and a function s:V → |A| such that (3) A ∃!t [s], (4)
A ∀xA [s], for all B ∈ Γ , A B [s], and for all C ∈ ∆, 2A C [s]. So by (1),
(5) 2 Axt [s]. By (4), for all d ∈ |A∀|,  A [s(x|d)], and by (3), s(t) ∈ |A∀|, so
 A [s(x|s(t))]. The latter contradicts (5) by the Substitution Lemma and the
conditions on t in (L∀).
(R∀). Suppose (1)  ∃!x, Γ ⇒ ∆,A, but (2) 2 Γ ⇒ ∆,∀xA. Then there is a
structure A and a function s:V → |A| such that for all B ∈ Γ , A B [s], for all
C ∈ ∆, 2A C [s] and (3) 2A ∀xA [s]. By (3), for some d ∈ |A∀|, 2A A [s(x|d)].
As x is not free in any formulas in Γ or ∆, s and s(x|d) agree for any of these
formulas, and so for all B ∈ Γ , A B [s(x|d)] and for all C ∈ ∆, 2A C [s(x|d)] Of
course also, by (1), A ∃!x, Γ ⇒ ∆,A [s(x|d)], and so if A ∃!x [s(x|d)], then (4)
A A [s(x|d)]. But d ∈ |A∀|, hence A ∃!x [s(x|d)], and we reach a contradiction
between (3) and (4).
(RI). Suppose (1)  Γ ⇒ ∆,Axt , (2)  Γ ⇒ ∆,Bxt , (3)  A,Γ ⇒ ∆,x = t,
but 2 Γ ⇒ ∆, Ix[A,B], where x is not free in any formulas in Γ and ∆. Then
by the last, there is a structure A and a function s:V → |A| such that for all
C ∈ Γ , A C [s], for all D ∈ ∆, 2A D [s] and (4) 2A Ix[A,B] [s]. So by (1),
A Axt [s], by (2) A B
x
t [s]. By (4) it is not the case that there is d ∈ |A|
such that: A A [s(x|d)], there is no other e ∈ |A| such that A A [s(x|e)],
and A B [s(x|d)], i.e. for every d ∈ |A|: either 2A A [s(x|d)], or for some
e ∈ |A| other that d, A A [s(x|e)], or 2A B [s(x|d)]. Consider s(t). We have (5)
2A A [s(x|s(t))], or (6) for some e ∈ |A| other that s(t), A A [s(x|e)], or (7)
2A B [s(x|s(t))]. From (5) and (7) by the Substitution Lemma, 2A Axt [s] and
2A Bxt [s], contradicting (1) and (2). This leaves (6). Consider the function that
is just like s but assigns e to x. x is not free in any formulas in Γ and ∆, so s and
s(x|e) agree on all formulas in them, i.e. C ∈ Γ , A C [s(x|e)], for all D ∈ ∆,
2A D [s(x|e)]. Hence by (3) if A A [s(x|e)], then A x = t [s(x|e)]. But e is
different from s(t), hence 2A x = t [s(x|e)], and so 2A A [s(x|e)], contradicting
(6). Overall contradiction. Hence  Γ ⇒ ∆, Ix[A,B].
(LI1). Suppose (1)  A,B, Γ ⇒ ∆, but 2 Ix[A,B], Γ ⇒ ∆, x not free in Γ,∆.
From the latter, there is a structure A and a function s:V → |A| such that (2)
A Ix[A,B] [s], for all C ∈ Γ , A C [s], for all D ∈ ∆, 2A D [s]. As (2), there is
exactly one d ∈ |A| such that A A [s(x|d)] and for this d, (4) A B [s(x|d)]. x is
not free in Γ,∆, so s and s(x|d) agree on all formulas in them. Hence from (1),
either (3) 2A A [s(x|d)] or (4) 2A B [s(x|d)]. Either way, contradiction. Hence
 Ix[A,B], Γ ⇒ ∆.
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(LI2). Suppose (1)  Γ ⇒ ∆,At1 , (2)  Γ ⇒ ∆,At2 , (3)  Γ ⇒ ∆,Ct2 , but
2 Ix[A,B], Γ ⇒ ∆,Ct1 . Then there is a structure A and a function s:V → |A|
such that (4) A Ix[A,B] [s], for all C ∈ Γ , A C [s], for all D ∈ ∆, 2A D [s]
and 2A Ct1 [s], from which by the Substitution Lemma (5) 2A C [s(x|s(t1))]. So
from (1) and (2), (6) A At1 [s] and (7) A At2 [s], and from (3), A Ct2 [s], from
which by the Substitution Lemma (8) A C [s(x|s(t2))]. By (4), there is exactly
one d ∈ |A| such that A A [s(x|d)]. Hence from (6) and (7) s(t1) = s(t2) = d.
Thus from (5) and 2A C [s(x|d)] and (8) A C [s(x|d)]. Contradiction. Hence
 Ix[A,B], Γ ⇒ ∆,Ct1 .
Theorem 4 Any consistent set of formulas ∆ can be extended to a maximally
consistent set ∆+ such that:
(a) for any formula A and variable x, if ¬∀xA ∈ ∆+, then for some constant c,
∃!c ∈ ∆+ and Axc 6∈ ∆+;
(b) for any formulas A and B and variable x, if Ix[A,B] ∈ ∆+, then for some
constant c, Axc , B
x
c ∈ ∆+ and for all constants d, if Axd ∈ ∆+, then d = c ∈ ∆+.
(c) for any formulas A and B and variable x, if ¬Ix[A,B] ∈ ∆+, then for all
constants c, either Axc 6∈ ∆+, or for some constant d, Axd ∈ ∆+ and d = c 6∈ ∆+,
or Bxc 6∈ ∆+.
Proof. As usual, extend L to a language L+ by adding countably new constants
ordered by a list C = c1, c2 . . ., and extend ∆ by following an enumeration
A1, A2 . . . of the formulas of L+ on which every formula occurs infinitely many
times as follows:
∆0 = ∆
If ∆n, An is inconsistent, then
∆n+1 = ∆n.
If ∆n, An is consistent, then:
(i) If An has neither the form ¬∀xA nor Ix[A,B] nor ¬Ix[A,B], then
∆n+1 = ∆n, An
(ii) If An has the form ¬∀xA, then
∆n+1 = ∆n,¬∀xA, ∃!c,¬Axc
where c is the first constant of C that does not occur in ∆n or An;
(iii) If An has the form Ix[A,B], then





where c is the first constant of C that does not occur in ∆n or An.
(iv) If An is has the form ¬Ix[A,B], then
∆n+1 = ∆n,¬Ix[A,B], Σn
where Σn is constructed in the following way. Take a sequence of formulas
σ1, σ2 . . . of the form A
x
a →  Bxa → ¬(Axc → c = a), where a is a constant
in ∆n, An, and c is a constant on C not in ∆n, An or any previous formulas in
the sequence. Let A = a1, a2, . . . be an enumeration of all constants occurring
in ∆n, An. In case ∆0 contains infinitely many formulas, it must be ensured
that C is not depleted of constants needed later. So pick constants from C by
a method that ensures some constants are always left over for later use. The
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following will do. Let σ1 be A
x




c1 → c1 = a1), where a1 is
the first formula of A and c1 is the first formula of C not in ∆n, An; let σ2




c2 → c2 = a2), where a2 is the second formula on A
and c2 is the 2
2 = 4th constant of C not in ∆n, An, σ1. In general, let σn be




cn → cn = an), where an is the nth constant of A and cn is
the 2nth constant of C not in ∆n, An nor any σi, i < n. Let the entire collection
of σis be Σn.
∆n+1 is consistent if ∆n, An is:
Case (i). Trivial.
Case (ii). Suppose ∆n+1 = ∆n,¬∀xA, ∃!c,¬Axc is inconsistent. Then for some
finite ∆′n ⊆ ∆n: ` ∆′n,¬∀xA, ∃!c,¬Axc ⇒ ⊥. Hence ` ∆′n,¬∀xA,∃!c ⇒ Axc by
deductive properties of negation. As c does not occur in any formula in ∆′n nor
in ¬∀xA, it occurs parametrically, and so by (R∀), ` ∆′n,¬∀xA ⇒ ∀xA. Hence
` ∆′n ⇒ ∀xA, again by deductive properties of negation. But then ∆′n,¬∀xA is
inconsistent, and hence so is ∆n,¬∀xA.




c is inconsistent. Then for some
finite∆′n ⊆ ∆n, ` ∆′n, Ix[A,B], Axc , Bxc ⇒ ⊥. As c does not occur in∆′n, Ix[A,B],
it occurs parametrically, and hence by (LI1), ` ∆′n, Ix[A,B]⇒ ⊥, i.e.∆′n, Ix[A,B]
is inconsistent, and so is ∆n, Ix[A,B].
Case (iv). Suppose ∆n+1 = ∆n,¬Ix[A,B], Σn is inconsistent. Then for some
finite ∆′n ⊆ ∆n and a finite {σj . . . σk} ⊆ Σn, ` ∆′n,¬Ix[A,B], σj . . . σk ⇒ ⊥.
Let σk be A
x
ak
→  Bxak → ¬(A
x
ck
→ ck = ak). Then by the deductive properties
of implication and negation:
` ∆′n,¬Ix[A,B], σj . . . σk−1 ⇒ Axak
` ∆′n,¬Ix[A,B], σj . . . σk−1 ⇒ Bxak
` ∆′n,¬Ix[A,B], σj . . . σk−1, Axck ⇒ ck = ak
ck was chosen so as not to occur in any previous σi, i < k, nor in ∆n, An. The
conditions for (RI) are fulfilled, and so ` ∆′n,¬Ix[A,B], σj . . . σk−1 ⇒ Ix[A,B].
But ` ∆′n,¬Ix[A,B], σj . . . σk−1 ⇒ ¬Ix[A,B]. So ∆′n,¬Ix[A,B], σj . . . σk−1 is
inconsistent. Repeat this process from σk−1 all the way down to σj , showing
that ∆′n,¬Ix[A,B] is inconsistent. Hence so is ∆n,¬Ix[A,B].
Let ∆+ be the union of all ∆i.
∆+ is maximal, for if neither A not ¬A are in ∆+, then there is a ∆k ⊆ ∆+
such that ∆k, A ` ⊥ and ∆k,¬A ` ⊥, but then ∆k is inconsistent, contradicting
the method of construction of ∆k.
∆+ is consistent, because otherwise some ∆i would have to be inconsistent,
but they are not.
∆+ satisfies (a) by construction.









c ∈ ∆+. Suppose Axd ∈ ∆+. Then there is
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a ∆′ ⊆ ∆+ such that ` ∆′ ⇒ Axc , ` ∆′ ⇒ Axd and by properties of identity
` ∆′ ⇒ d = d. But then by (LI2), ` ∆′, Ix[A,B] ⇒ d = c, hence d = c ∈ ∆+
by the deductive closure of ∆+.
To see that it satisfies (c), suppose ¬Ix[A,B] ∈ ∆+, but for some constant
c, Axc ∈ ∆, (1) for all constants d, if Axd ∈ ∆+, then d = c ∈ ∆+, and Bxc ∈ ∆+.
As every formula occurs infinitely many times on the enumeration of formulas of
L+, there is a ∆n that contains Axc and Bxc and ∆n+1 = ∆n,¬Ix[A,B], Σn. Thus
Axc →  Bxc → ¬(Axb → b = c) ∈ Σn, for some constant b of C. Consequently, this
formula is in ∆+, too. By the deductive properties of implication and negation
and the deductive closure and consistency of ∆+, (2) Ab ∈ ∆n+1 and b = c 6∈
∆n+1. But by (1) and (2), b = c ∈ ∆+. Contradiction.
This completes the proof of Theorem 4.
Theorem 5 If ∆ is a consistent set of formulas, then ∆ is satisfiable.
Proof. Extend ∆ to a maximally consistent set ∆+ as per Theorem 4. Next
we construct from ∆+ a structure A and function s:V → |A|. The domain |A|
of the structure A is the set of equivalence classes of terms under identities
t1 = t2 ∈ ∆+. Denote the equivalence class to which t belongs by [t]. The
domain of quantification |A∀| of A is the set of equivalence classes of terms t such
that ∃!t ∈ ∆+. Clearly |A∀| ⊆ |A|. A assigns the same set to ∃!. Furthermore,
〈[t1], . . . [tn]〉 ∈ PA iff Pt1 . . . tn ∈ ∆, cA = [c], for every constant c (old and
new), and fA(t1 . . . tn) = [f(t1 . . . tn)], for any function symbol. For the function
s:V → |A|, s(x) = [x]. If follows by induction that s(t) = [t]. We’ll show by
induction over the number of connectives in formulas A that
A A [s] if and only if A ∈ ∆+.
Suppose A is an atomic formula. (a) A is Pt1 . . . tn. Then A Pt1 . . . tn [s] iff
〈s(t1) . . . s(tn)〉 ∈ PA, iff 〈[t1] . . . [tn]〉 ∈ PA, iff Pt1 . . . tn ∈ ∆+. (b) A is t1 = t2.
Then A t1 = t2 [s] iff s(t1) = s(t2), iff [t1] = [t2], and as these are equivalence
classes under identities in ∆+, iff t1 = t2 ∈ ∆+.
Suppose A A [s] if and only if A ∈ ∆, where A has fewer than n connectives.
Case 1. A is ¬B. A ¬B [s] iff 2A B [s], iff B 6∈ ∆+, by induction hypothesis, iff
¬B ∈ ∆+, by maximality of ∆+.
Case 2. A is B → C. A B → C [s] iff 2A B or A C [s], iff B 6∈ ∆+ or
C ∈ ∆+, by induction hypothesis, iff ¬B ∈ ∆+ or C ∈ ∆+, by maximality of
∆+. `⇒ ¬B → (B → C) and `⇒ C → (B → C), so either way, ∆+ ` B → C,
and as ∆+ is deductively closed, B → C ∈ ∆+. Conversely, if B → C ∈ ∆+,
then either ¬B ∈ ∆+ or C ∈ ∆+, as otherwise B ∈ ∆+ by maximality, hence
C ∈ ∆+, by deductive closure, contradiction. So by induction hypothesis, 2A B
or A C [s], and thus A B → C [s]. Hence A B → C [s] iff B → C ∈ ∆+.
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Case 3. A is ∀xB.
(a) First, if A ∀xB [s], then ∀xB ∈ ∆+. Suppose ∀xB 6∈ ∆+. Then ¬∀xB ∈ ∆+,
by maximality, and so for some constant c, ¬Bxc ,∃!c ∈ ∆+. Hence by inductive
hypothesis 2A Bxc [s] and A ∃!c [s]. Hence cA ∈ |A∀|, and so if A ∀xB [s],
then for this c, A B [s(x|s(c))], so by the Substitution Lemma A Bxc [s].
Contradiction.
(b) Next, if ∀xA ∈ ∆+, then A ∀xA [s]. If 2A ∀xA [s], then for some [t] ∈ |A∀|,
2A A [s(x|[t])]. By the existence of alphabetic variants, there is a formula A′
that is semantically equivalent to A such that t is substitutable for x in A′, so
2A A′ [s(x|[t])]. s(t) = [t], so 2A A′ [s(x|s(t))], so by the Substitution Lemma
2A A′xt [s]. Hence A′xt 6∈ ∆+, by induction hypothesis. Hence ∀xA′ 6∈ ∆+, by
consistency and deductive closure, hence ∀xA 6∈ ∆+, by interdeducibility of
alphabetic variants.
Case 4. A is Ix[A,B].
(a) First, if A Ix[A,B] [s], then Ix[A,B] ∈ ∆+. If Ix[A,B] 6∈ ∆+, then by
deductive closure ¬Ix[A,B] ∈ ∆+, and so (1) for all constants c, either Axc 6∈ ∆+,
or for some constant d, Axd ∈ ∆+ and d = c 6∈ ∆+, or Bxc 6∈ ∆+. If A Ix[A,B] [s],
then there is a [t1] ∈ |A| such that: A A [s(x|[t1])], (2) there is no other [t2] ∈ |A|
such that A A [s(x|[t2])], and A B [s(x|[t1])]. s(t1) = [t1], so A A [s(x|s(t1))]
and A B [s(x|s(t1))], so by the substitution lemma A Axt1 [s] and A B
x
t1 [s].
Thus by induction hypothesis, Axt1 , B
x
t1 ∈ ∆
+. But by (1) either Axt1 6∈ ∆
+, or for
some constant d, Axd ∈ ∆+ and d = t1 6∈ ∆+, or Bxt1 6∈ ∆
+. As just established
the first and third options are out, which leaves the second, and so by induction
hypothesis, A Axd [s] and 2A d = t1 [s]. So [d] 6= [t1]. By the substitution lemma
A A [s(x|s(d))], and as s(d) = [d], A A [s(x|[d])]. But this contradicts (2).
Consequently Ix[A,B] ∈ ∆+.
(b) Next, if Ix[A,B] ∈ ∆+, then A Ix[A,B] [s]. If Ix[A,B] ∈ ∆+, then there
is a constant c such that Axc , B
x
c ∈ ∆+ and for all constants d, if Axd ∈ ∆+, then
d = c ∈ ∆+. Hence by induction hypothesis A Axc [s] and A Bxc [s]. cA =
[c], so by the substitution lemma, A A [s(x|[c])] and A B [s(x|[c])]. Suppose
A A [s(x|[d])], then by induction hypothesis Axd ∈ ∆+, and so d = c ∈ ∆+.
Hence [d] = [c] and there is no other [t] ∈ |A| such that A A [s(x|[t])]. Hence
A Ix[A,B] [s].
Finally, restrict the language again to the language of ∆: structure A constructed
from ∆+ satisfies ∆.
This completes the proof of Theorem 5.
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